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Abstract
The economic success of the East Asian countries has inspired many
economists to study the background of their rapid growth. Interestingly,
different economists interpret this success in entirely different ways. During the
1970s and an important part of the 1980s advocates of the neoclassical model
argued that growth in East Asia was the result mainly of the market mechanism
and the emphasis on export promotion in these countries. Especially since the
mid-1980s the neoclassical approach was criticised by economists who stressed
that government intervention played a crucial role in the process of economic
growth. This paper aims at presenting a survey of the arguments recently put
forward by the critics of the neoclassical approach to explain the role of
government in the economic success of the countries in East Asia. Such a
survey is very useful, since it forms a new breeding ground for the discussion
on the role of the government in the economic deve-lopment of other
developing countries and the countries in Eastern Europe.
                    
     
1 I would like to thank Catrinus Jepma and Robert Lensink for their comments on an earlier
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1. Introduction
Without a doubt East Asia’s economic expansion during the past twenty years is
one of the most remarkable economic changes since the Second World War.
Gross national product of the East Asian countries
2 increased by more than five
per cent per year in the period 1965-1990, which is considerably larger than that
of Latin America (1.8 per cent), sub-Saharan Africa (0.3 per cent), or even the
OECD (2.4 per cent). Six of the seven fastest growing economies in the period
1960-1985 (measured on the basis of the average growth of per capita GDP)
were East Asian countries.
3
The economic success of these countries has inspired many economists to
study the background of this rapid growth. What is rather remarkable in this
context is the fact that different economists interpret this success in entirely
different ways. During the 1970s and an important part of the 1980s advocates
of the neoclassical model argued that growth in East Asia was the result mainly
of the market mechanism and the emphasis on export promotion in these
countries. This interpretation dominated the debate for a long time. Especially
since the mid-1980s the neoclassical approach was criticised by economists who
stressed that government intervention actually played a crucial role in the
process of economic growth. In this paper these economists are referred to as
the new interventionists.
4 The debate between the neoclassical economists and
the new interventionists seems to concentrate on the issue concerning the role of
the government in the process of economic development in general, and the
East Asian growth miracle in particular.
                    
     
2 In this article East Asia includes the following countries: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. A significant part of the literature
used for this article concentrates mainly on South Korea and Taiwan.
     
3 Data from the World Bank (1993, pp. 2-3).
     
4 Elsewhere in the literature they are also referred to as UHYLVLRQLVW, VWUXFWXUDO or KHWHURGR[
economists.2
This paper mainly aims at presenting a survey of the arguments recently put
forward by the critics of the neoclassical approach to explain the economic
success of the countries in East Asia. In particular, it emphasises their view with
respect to the role of the government in the process of economic development.
Such a listing of the contributions of the new interventionists concerning the
backgrounds of the Asian miracle and the possible contribution of the
government is very useful. It forms a new breeding ground for the discussion on
the role of the government in the economic development of other developing
countries and the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the
contributions of development economists with respect to the role of the
government in the process of economic development as put forward by them in
the 1940s and 1950s. Section 3 describes the reactions of the neoclassical
economists on these early contributions. They emphasised that especially the
market mechanism played an important role in the growth of the East Asian
countries. Section 4 deals with the critics of the neoclassical economists and
describes their approach to the backgrounds of the Asian miracle. Section 5
contains a synthesis of both approaches with respect to the role of the
government versus the market in the growth of East Asia. Section 6 discusses
the possible lessons for other developing countries and the countries in Eastern
Europe concerning the role of the market versus the government in the process
of their economic growth.
2. The Early Discussion on Economic Development and the
Role of the Government
5
                    
     
5 See also Krugman (1993).3
The discussion on the role of the government in the process of economic
development originated in the 1940s and 1950s. This discussion fits into the
postwar predominance of Keynesian economics. During this period several
theoretical models contributions in the literature pointed out that market
imperfections justified government intervention. The main emphasis was on the
existence and benefits of economies of scale and the external effects of
production. One of the most influential models was the model of
industrialisation based on the notion of infant industry. The existence of
dynamic economies of scale and positive external effects of production in
certain industries prompted the government to actively stimulate the
development of these industries since the private sector was thought to be
incapable of assessing the long-term economic benefits of investing in these
industries. According to this model the government would stimulate the
development of these industries by means of subsidies and protective measures
until they were sufficiently developed to produce without government support.
Other models went further in their recommendations concerning the role of
the government in development. According to several economists, the economic
growth potential of developing countries was restricted since many of these
countries mainly exported primary goods. They expected that the prices of these
goods relative to prices of industrial goods would fall permanently; this is also
known as export pessimism (Prebisch, 1950). By combining the infant industry
argument with export pessimism they pointed out that a structural change in the
production structure of these countries was absolutely necessary in order to
obtain positive long-run economic growth prospects. The government ought to
play an important role since such a drastic change could never be realised
through the market mechanism due to considerably large coordination problems
in the economy. The emphasis was put on improving infrastructure and
education. Both these aspects were assumed to be extremely important in order
to realise such a structural change. Furthermore, the mutual dependence of
industries was pointed out: the development of one industry was also
determined by the development of other sectors, either as a producer of inputs4
or as a demander of output. This caused simultaneous support of different
industries necessary.
Later on, the debate in literature concentrated on the way in which the
government ought to intervene. Some supported simultaneous intervention in all
industries essential to economic growth (balanced growth strategy; see Lewis,
1955; Nurkse, 1953; and Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). Others stressed the limited
availability of scarce resources which would hinder the execution of such a
comprehensive strategy. They advocated government intervention mainly in
those industries that had the most relations with other industries (unbalanced
growth strategy; see Hirschman, 1958).
These models very much influenced the economic policies pursued by the
various developing countries during the 1950s, 1960s, and a large part of the
1970s. The idea of a government intervening in the process of economic growth
was appealing to many politicians. It contributed to developing models of
central planning, and it stimulated to using trade policies, such as import quota,
export subsidies, and fixed exchange rates, introducing price controls and
subsidies in markets for goods and production factors, and establishing public
enterprises in important sectors like mining and heavy industries. Many
governments pursued policies of import substitution (and later also export
promotion). Initially, several countries appeared to be successful in achieving
economic growth by way of government intervention. However, as increasingly
more problems arose with respect to the models of planned economic growth,
this approach was increasingly criticised by economists whose ideas matched
the neoclassical tradition.
3. The Neoliberal Model and the Explanation of the Asian
Economic Miracle
The criticism of the neoclassical economists - or neoliberals
6 - was aimed
                    
     
6 This is the term to which they are referred to in the debate on the role of markets versus the
government in the process of growth.5
mainly at the fact that the above described models primarily pointed at the
imperfections of the market mechanism; the models seemed not to be concerned
about the possibility that government intervention in itself could also lead to an
inefficient allocation of resources. The neoclassical economists rejected the
implicit assumption that allocative inefficiency due to market imperfections
would always be larger than the inefficiency resulting from government
failures. This assumption would imply that the government has sufficient
information in order to determine for which particular industries positive
externalities and dynamic economies of scale could be expected, and to properly
assess the costs and benefits of supporting certain activities and industries. This
also would imply a well-functioning apparatus of government within which this
information would be translated into a policy in the right way. Moreover, it
meant that the government would also be strong enough to resist pressure
groups and to minimalise the negative effects of rent-seeking behaviour.
Finally, it was anticipated that the government put maximum welfare for the
country as a whole before maximising the individual objectives of those
representing the government.
The neoliberals very much doubted the fact that these conditions had been
sufficiently met in developing countries. They were rather convinced of the fact
that especially such factors as lobbying, rent seeking, and a government
pursuing maximisation of the individual welfare function, would negatively
affect the efficiency of intervention. Therefore, they concluded that the
imperfections of government intervention generally exceeded market
imperfections. Only in some cases the government could play a role, e.g. with
respect to providing physical infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and
maintaining order and upholding the law. This is all the government should do.
The device of getting the prices right plays a crucial role in the neoliberal view:
if the markets are not interfered with, scarce resources will be allocated most
efficiently. This criticism is best put into words by Krueger (1990
a and 1990
b)
and Lal (1983), two of the most important representatives of the neoliberal
view. Their starting points were the basis of the IMF and World Bank policy6
recommendations that were part of the structural adjustment programmes
presented to developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s.
The neoliberal interpretation of the role of the government versus the role of
the market in the process of economic development has also been applied in
analysing the economic success of East Asia of the past three decades.
According to the neoliberals, the governments of these countries observed the
limits of their capabilities, and the economic success, therefore, was caused
mainly by the market which functioned quite well. They especially pointed out
the emphasis governments placed on developing and stimulating exports,
private entrepreneurship, and the execution of market-oriented policy measures.
Focusing on export enhanced the development of industries with a comparative
advantage. The East Asian countries especially developed those industries in
which they had a comparative advantage. The governments had created the right
environment - by providing macroeconomic stability and public investment in
social and physical infrastructure - in which the private sector was encouraged
to invest in such a way that it would contribute positively to economic
development.
The neoliberal interpretation of the economic success of the East Asian
countries was supported by the observation that several African and Latin
American countries, where the government had played a very significant role
for several decades, had experienced a deep economic crisis since the 1980s.
The failure of government intervention and the positive contributions of the
market mechanism were elaborately discussed in studies by, among others,
Balassa (1977), Corbo et al. (1985), Hughes et al. (1988), Krueger (1978),
Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1970), and Michaely et al. (1987). These studies
considered the East Asian countries as examples of countries where the market
mechanism had positively influenced the process of economic development.
The neoliberal criticism of the models from the 1940s and 1950s was
justified to a certain extent. They rightly emphasised that too much government
interference in the process of economic development could lead to considerable
inefficiencies. They provided a theoretical basis for the possibility and7
consequences of government failure (Islam, 1992). Since the early 1970s and
especially during the 1980s practically everybody agreed on the fact that
government-led economic development, with an important role for state
enterprises, would lead to large inefficiencies.
However, this did not automatically mean that the neoliberal alternative
provided a correct interpretation of the backgrounds of the successes in East
Asia (Wade, 1991). Since the mid-1980s there was increasing criticism of the
neoliberal interpretation of the role of the market versus the role of the
government in development. These critics can be referred to as new
interventionists. This group of economists argued that the government could
contribute more to economic development than just providing certain important
public goods. They based their ideas mainly on their analysis of the
backgrounds of economic success in East Asia. The centre of their analysis
proved to have rather a lot in common with the analyses of and themes
addressed by development economists of the 1940s and 1950s.
4. Criticism of the Neoliberal Model and the Arguments in
Favour of Government Intervention
According to the new interventionists, the neoliberal interpretation could not
explain satisfactorily the success of the East Asian countries. A growing amount
of research showed that government could indeed contribute positively to
growth by means of comprehensive intervention in the economic process. This
was not in keeping with the usual neoliberal starting points, and therefore
alternative approaches were sought after to explain for this finding.
An important alternative explanation of the East Asian economic success
was found by emphasising the extent of problems concerning coordination in
less developed economies. Critics of the neoliberal interpretation pointed out
that the government could play an important role in stimulating the process of
economic development by reducing coordination problems, related to the choice
of and relationship between production decisions, that hinder development (see8
e.g. Akyhz and Gore, 1994; Amsden and Singh, 1994; Rodrik, 1994; and Singh,
1995). These problems concerning coordination are the result of dynamic
economies of scale of production and external effects resulting from the strong
mutual dependence of certain industries. If such circumstances do play a role,
the allocation of resources on the basis of the market mechanism can quite
easily become sub-optimal.
To begin with, in practice market prices provide information about the
current profitability of productive activities; they contain hardly any - if at all -
information on future profitability. Under these circumstances, if there are any
activities that lead to economies of scale in the future, current market prices
give the wrong signals with respect to optimal allocation. In this case, allocation
will not be dynamically efficient. Moreover, investment decisions at the level of
the individual entrepreneur may be sub-optimal if the future profitability of an
investment project also depends on the degree to which investments are made in
other sectors at the same time. In this case, too, allocation of resources based on
the free market principle results in dynamically inefficient allocation.
According to the new interventionists, interventions of East Asian
governments were mainly aimed at decreasing these coordination problems,
thus stimulating economic growth. The interventions actually improved the
economy since barriers caused by economies of scale and external effects were
taken down, which probably would not have happened if resource allocation
was based purely on market principles.
The model explaining the East Asian economic miracle as proposed by
these new interventionists matches some of the central thoughts of the
development economists of the 1940s and 1950s. One major difference,
however, is that this model is formalised in some recent contributions (see, for
example, Matsuyama, 1991; Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1989; and Rodrik,
1996).
7
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competition -  rather than free markets - and protection and co-ordination by the government (see,9
The remainder of this section will discuss in more detail several of the
above mentioned aspects of the East Asian intervention policy, such as the
characteristics of industrial policies, the instruments that were used to stimulate
specific investments, the institutional context, and the preconditions.
4.1 Industrial policy
The contents and effectiveness of the industrial policies pursued in the East
Asian countries is the central focus of several new interventionist studies,
focusing mainly on the analysis of the Korean experiences (see, for example,
Amsden, 1989 and 1992; Auty, 1991; Hikino and Amsden, 1994; Wade, 1990;
and Woo, 1991). Amsden (1989) is a seminal work in this respect, in which she
presents a new interventionist interpretation of the economic development of
South Korea. In her analysis she shows why the Korean government policy can
be considered dynamically efficient. She emphasises the fact that government
intervention led to a situation of getting the prices wrong, which, according to
her, precisely resulted in an optimal allocation of scarce resources. By
deliberately disturbing prices, the government was able to reduce the
coordination problems that occur when allocation of resources is left to the
market mechanism. Policies aiming at disturbing the market mechanism led to
other priorities concerning what should be produced as compared to the
outcomes of the market as the coordinating mechanism. The industrial policies
of other rapid growers in the region has been interpreted in a similar manner in
other studies (see also Wade, 1990; and Rodan, 1989).
Amsden characterises the process of economic development in South Korea
as the process of late industrialisation. Fast growth in this country is mainly
based on the implementation of existing (Western) technologies. The aspect of
learning, adopting and adjusting existing technologies is central in her analysis.
Since learning processes have the characteristics of a public good and are
                                                            
for example, Jacquemin, 1987; and Schmalensee and Willig, 1989).10
closely related to increasing economies of scale and the external effects of
production, government intervention is vital in the process of late
industrialisation. The government sees to it that the Western technology is
copied and implemented as efficiently as possible, and that the labour force is
educated sufficiently to work with the new technology (Hikino and Amsden,
1994). Moreover, they coordinate production decisions in different industries.
Thus, the government becomes an entrepreneur who decides what, when, and
how much to produce (Amsden, 1989).
The active intervention resulted in the industrial development of South
Korea, which would not have been realised without government intervention,
according to Amsden. The government especially stimulated those industries
that were thought to be of crucial importance to the long-term development of
South Korea. Whereas in the 1960s mainly export-oriented industries were
stimulated, in the 1970s emphasis was placed on the development of heavy and
chemical industries, the electronics industry, and shipbuilding. In the 1980s the
centre of attention of industrial policies shifted towards stimulating the
development of high-quality industries, the so-called sunrise industries. Due to
government intervention South Korea became a leading producer of micro-
chips, and had an important share in the world markets for consumer
electronics, cars, and in shipbuilding. In this context, Amsden and others
(Amsden and Singh, 1994; Auty, 1991; Singh, 1994; and Wade, 1991) point out
the difficulties involved in the development of especially heavy and chemical
industries, and in electronics and shipbuilding. The relatively long time these
industries require to reach maturity, and the limited profitability (or even
temporary loss) during the initial phase cause these industries to be rather
unattractive when it comes to private investment. This provides a legitimate
reason for an active industrial policy by the government.
4.2 Instruments of government intervention
The East Asian governments used various instruments that enabled them to
influence the organisation of production decisions and the allocation of11
production factors, in order to achieve that scarce resources would be applied in
the areas they preferred. These instruments primarily aim at creating rents, i.e.
providing subsidies for certain investments. A subsidy may be a strong
instrument to influence the use and allocation of means, provided that the
granting meets certain conditions (see below). A subsidy will contain a
protective element on the one hand, and provide an incentive to implement
specific activities on the other hand. Given these conditions, a subsidy may
contribute to the fact that investors who are granted a subsidy may take into
account more than short-term profitability only, and may also consider future
possible profitability of the decisions. In these cases, the dynamic aspects of
implementing investment decisions are taken into account, and thus granting
subsidies may contribute to a better allocation of means.
Initially, subsidies were granted by means of programmes for cheap credit
and selective credit loans. In countries like South Korea and Taiwan, the
government had a significant impact on determining the nominal deposit and
loan rate in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, they also introduced guidelines
with respect to the allocation of bank loans to the private sector. Thus, they
were able to stimulate the development of specific industries and private
activities by granting them access to external funding and by subsidising this
funding.
8 Furthermore, instruments like tax advantages, selective granting of
available foreign currencies, and the stimulation of cartels were used to
positively influence the investment behaviour of the private sector. Finally, in
certain specific cases, like for example the case of the South Korean
shipbuilding industry, the government explicitly guaranteed that possible loss-
making investment decisions would be compensated for. Rodrik (1994, pp. 32-
33) refers to this as "...the socialization of investment risk in selected sectors."
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among others, Cho (1989), Cho and Hellmann (1993), Choi (1993), Hellmann, Murdock, and
Stiglitz (1995 and 1996), Hermes (1995, chapter 5), Vittas and Cho (1995), Vittas and Wang
(1991), and World Bank (1993).12
The new interventionists explain the fact that rents did not lead to economic
inefficiency - as the neoliberals generally argue - by means of a number of
specific characteristics of the way East Asian governments created and used
rents (Akyhz and Gore, 1994). First, they were introduced only for those
activities that were important to the nation as a whole. Second, they were not
simply granted directly to individual firms. Firms had to compete for these
subsidies (so-called contests; see, e.g. Amsden, 1989; Hellmann, Murdock, and
Stiglitz, 1995; and World Bank, 1993). As part of these contests, they had to
show why they should be granted a subsidy. The granting of subsidies was
therefore linked to certain performance criteria the investment project would
have to meet during its duration. Generally, this meant that firms would have to
be able to prove the positive development of their productivity and profitability
over a period time. With respect to the export industries, performance was
measured on the basis of the development of their sales in foreign markets.
Third, the rents were used only temporarily and selectively. Fourth,
governments acted explicitly against speculative activities and the diversion of
public funds to private use. Finally, the costs of rent seeking were small
especially due to the strong ties between government and the private sector (see
below, section 4.4).
In conclusion, it can be argued that the new interventionists particularly
point at the fact that the government made use of the market mechanism when
granting subsidies. Moreover, they stress the fact that the government could
discipline companies with respect to the use of the means they were granted.
Both these characteristics of granting subsidies form an important explanation
of their positive effects on the efficient allocation of resources, according to the
new interventionists.
Apart from granting subsidies in order to stimulate certain types of
investment, in several cases governments were actively involved in taking
specific investment decisions aiming at improving the coordination and
cooperation between different projects. Rodrik (1994) and Wade (1990) present
several examples that show that the governments of South Korea and Taiwan13
took the decisions in order to develop certain new industrial activities and
subsequently supervised and participated in the implementation of these
activities.
Finally, some authors point out that governments also made important
investments themselves, for example in the physical infrastructure and in
several basic industries (Jones and Sakong, 1980; Rodrik, 1994; and Wade,
1990). With repect to South Korea, they describe the characteristics of public
enterprises as firms that have many linkages with other industries, are highly
capital intensive, produce on a large scale, and produce mainly nontradeable
goods and import-substituting products. It is precisely these types of industries
and industrial activities for which coordination problems may be the most
pressing.
4.3 The role of the export promotion policy
Especially with respect to the role of export-oriented policies as part of
industrial policies, and the related specific instruments of government
intervention in East Asia, the neoliberals and the new interventionists do not
agree. In the neoliberal model the emphasis of government policies on export
promotion is very important, since they believe that competition on world
markets stimulated East Asian companies to produce efficiently. They exported
especially those products for which the countries had a comparative advantage
in production. According to the neoliberals, the rapid growth of exports justified
this approach. Subsequently, the development of export industries was thought
to have a positive effect on the production in other sectors of the economy (so-
called spill-over effects). In this model - the so-called model of export-led
development - the rapid growth of the export industries led to a growth in
investment and was therefore the driving force behind the overall economic
success (see, for example, Krueger, 1985; and World Bank, 1993).
The new interventionists disputed the neoliberal point of view. Some of
them point out the fact that the governments created comparative advantages,
thus actually reversing the causal relationship between export growth and14
comparative advantage. The above mentioned industrial policies in South Korea
can again be used to illustrate this view. The South Koreans developed
advantages in shipbuilding, and in the electronics and car industries, all
industries in which they initially did not have comparative advantages. Some
new interventionists stressed the fact that government intervention stimulated
especially those export industries for which competition in international markets
was fierce, in order to stimulate the building up of a competitive external sector.
To a certain degree, this view resembles the neoliberal interpretation of the role
of international trade, although the new interventionists put much more weight
into the role of government intervention to a develop such a competitive
external sector. They argue that international competition can be regarded as an
efficiency check of interventionist policies and the policy measures used. The
success or failure of export producing firms provided the government with
information which enabled it to decide whether or not to continue support to
particular industries, and to decide on the extent of this support. Thus,
protection measures and the granting of subsidies were linked to the
performance of firms with regard to the development of sales in foreign
markets.
Others, however, resist the argument that exports played a crucial role in
stimulating the economic growth of these countries (Rodrik, 1994). On the one
hand, they point at the limited share of the export sector in total GNP of most
East Asian growing countries in the period concerned. Considered this limited
share, this sector could never have been the driving force behind the strong
economic development during the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, the
direction of the causality between exports and investments as supposed by the
neoliberals is questioned. It is more likely that the explosive export growth was
the result of a strong increase in domestic investments, rather than the other way
round. The increase in these investments led to an increasing demand for
imports, which - taking into account the limited availability of foreign
currencies - went hand in hand with an increase in exports. This increase in
exports was realised by reducing the domestic consumption of tradeable goods,15
making them available for exports. Exports were not hampered by any
unfavourable exchange rate policies, which had indeed been the case in many
other developing countries in the 1960s, 1970s, and part of the 1980s. They
argue that export production was actively stimulated by means of several
instruments, particularly the above described systems of subsidisation.
Therefore, some new interventionists argue that the explanation of economic
growth in East Asian countries lies in the factors that influenced the strong
growth in domestic investments, such as the creation of rents to stimulate
investment behaviour (Rodrik, 1994).
4.4 Cooperation between the state and the private sector
In the previous sections it has been pointed out continuously that the East Asian
governments proved to be able to reduce coordination problems, which
contributed to stimulate economic growth. However, this still has not answered
the question concerning the way governments were able to dispose of sufficient
information to efficiently coordinate investment decisions and to determine
which industries were important in realising a dynamically efficient allocation
of scarce resources.
Several studies have examined this aspect. These studies show that very
close ties existed between the government, banks, and the private sector (see,
among others, Cho and Hellmann, 1993; Choi, 1987; Jones and Sakong, 1980;
Lee, 1992; Lee and Naya, 1988; and Wade, 1990). These ties led to frequent
contacts between the government and the private sector about the economy’s
weaknesses and strengths. In this way, the government gained a better
understanding of the nature of the coordination problems that played a role in
the economy. On the basis of this information the government was better able to
take decisions concerning intervention.
In the case of South Korea, civil servants from different ministries, bank
managers, and managers of large companies regularly met on so-called
deliberation councils. Apart from this there were also monthly export meetings.
At these meetings, presided by the president of the country and attended by16
senior civil servants, managers of banks and companies, economic bottlenecks
were directly discussed, and decisions were taken concerning the outlines of the
industrial, trade, and financial policies. Specific attention would be paid to the
performance of the export industries, and if necessary the export policy would
be adjusted on the basis of the information available.
The South Korean private sector was very much organised on the basis of
conglomerate structures, the so-called Chaebols. A limited number of very large
conglomerates were actively involved in various economic activities, thus
controlling an important part of the total production of the private sector. The
government actively stimulated the development of these large conglomerates
(Woo, 1991). The idea was that this would lead to an optimal use of economies
of scale and external effects due to the strong mutual dependence between
industries. In this way, the conglomerates would internalise existing
coordination problems.
Moreover, an advantage of the existence of several large conglomerates was
that there was only a small number of ties between the government and the
private sector, so that a relatively small number of policy makers and managers
would be responsible for making important decisions (Hermes, 1995). This
added to an efficient exchange of information and a reduction of coordination
problems.
Some studies describe the model of the East Asian economies as a governed
market. This means that private companies competed and cooperated and were
supervised by the government (Wade, 1990). Other studies - especially referring
to the case of South Korea - characterise the relations between government and
the private sector as a quasi internal organisation (Cho and Hellmann, 1993;
Haggard and Lee, 1995; and Lee, 1992), referring to Williamson’s internal
organisation model (1975). This model describes a firm as an organisation that
minimalises transaction costs by internalising certain activities, i.e. these
activities are executed within the organisation. This may cause the allocation
within an internal organisation to be superior to allocation resulting from the17
market mechanism. The model contains a central management that determines
the outlines of the activities of the firm and that delegates the execution and
immediate responsibility for the results to different divisions. The divisions are
accountable to the central management and have to provide information
regularly, enabling the management to change its strategy on the basis of this
new information - if necessary. In this way, coordination problems between the
different activities can be reduced.
The comparison to the characteristics of the Korean society applies to a
certain extent, if the government is regarded as the central manager and the
various conglomerates as the divisions. Due to the intense and informal contacts
between the government and the private sector, the government had at their
disposal information concerning the nature and extent of coordination problems
in the economy. On the basis of this information, economic policies could be
designed and choices could be made on which industries should be supported,
since they were supposed to be of crucial importance to the growth of the
country. Furthermore, economic policy programmes could constantly be
adjusted on the basis of new information so that they would positively
contribute to the economic development of the country.
To conclude, it can be argued that the strong ties between the government
and the private sector contributed to an intense exchange of information. Based
on this information, the government was able to follow and if necessary adjust
the activities in private industries. The new interventionists considered the
combination of these ties and the nature of the way the government created
rents and distributed these among firms and industrial sectors as an important
explanation of the successful government intervention in the various East Asian
countries.
4.5 Initial conditions and political factors
The new interventionists also point at other factors they feel have been
important in realising that the government translated the information they
received from the private sector into a policy that contributed to the successful18
reduction of coordination problems. These factors are closely related to the
initial conditions that applied at the moment this miraculous process of
economic growth was started. They also point at certain specific political-
economic circumstances.
To begin with, the new interventionists emphasise that in these countries the
educational system and the level of education of the labour force were of a
relatively high standard as early as the 1950s, especially compared to countries
in Latin America and Africa. This positive initial condition had various positive
consequences. To start with, this meant that labour productivity was relatively
high and that the East Asian economies were at least capable of working with
relatively high-grade production processes as early as the 1950s. Moreover, this
meant that the copying of Western technologies - which according to Amsden is
the essence of late industrialisation - could be executed faster. Finally, the high
level of education had a positive effect on the quality of the civil service.
The latter was not to be underestimated as an aspect of the success of the
East Asian intervention policy. Several authors have therefore paid special
attention to the aspect of the quality of the civil service. An efficient apparatus
of government was of great importance in order to translate the information on
coordination problems in the economy into a policy that could contribute to
increasing economic growth. Moreover, the work ethic of the average civil
servant in the Eastern Asian countries was also important in explaining the
efficiency of government intervention. In many developing countries civil
servants seemed to be easily corrupted, whereas in most East Asian countries
this was relatively less common. Consequently, the abuse of, for example, the
granting of subsidies and other benefits to firms could be kept rather limited. To
explain this phenomenon the new interventionists argued, among other things,
that in such countries as South Korea and Taiwan a high degree of social
responsibility had been developed and introduced through the educational
system. Education very much contributed to a sense of social awareness. This
led to the fact that a position as a civil servant involved a high social status. This
may be an explanation for the fact that the best students often accepted a19
position with the government whereas a similar position in the private sector
would pay far more. This high status would also contribute to a lower degree of
corruptness as compared to that in many other developing countries. Moreover,
a career with the civil service was considered the perfect way to a high position
in the private sector later (see e.g. Wade, 1991; and World Bank, 1993).
Apart from these initial conditions, several authors argue that the political-
economic circumstances in the East Asian countries contributed to the fact that
government intervention could concentrate on the efficient use of scarce
resources. As is well-known from the public-choice literature, a government
may implement a policy because they are being pressurised by certain groups in
society that are crucial to a possible re-election. In such case, in their policy the
government may to a certain extent want to comply with the wishes of their
future voters, rather than pursue a policy that contributes to economic growth as
much as possible.
9 For example, they may not use subsidies to support certain
important economic activities; instead subsidies may be used to secure political
support. In many Latin American and African countries such a populist policy
has been pursued in the past with all the associated negative consequences to
general economic growth. In case of a more autocratic government, the
government will use part of the means available to bribe representatives of
powerful lobbies who could jeopardise the government’s continuity or to
forcefully suppress these lobbies.
In South Korea and Taiwan the government hardly ever faced lobbies of
real importance so that a populist policy was not necessary. Therefore, they
could develop and pursue their policies independent of any lobby and they
could efficiently employ subsidies and other instruments to promote economic
growth, rather than use them in order to gain political support (see, among
others, Haggard, 1990; and Rodrik, 1994). There were several different reasons
for this particular circumstance, according to the new interventionists.
                    
     
9 See Schuknecht (1996), among others, for an empirical analysis of such kind of political-
economic processes.20
To start with, countries like South Korea and Taiwan were characterised by
a relatively equal income distribution (Rodrik, 1994) due to which the
governments of these countries were less pressurised into taking popular
measures to please certain lobbies. The equal income distribution was mainly
the result of the land reforms of the 1950s which took place both in South Korea
and Taiwan. Thus, equal income distribution had been realised before the start
of the period of rapid growth. More recently, empirical support for the positive
relation between equal income distribution and economic growth has been
found (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; and Persson and Tabellini, 1994).
Moreover, some mention the fact that both the South Korean and the
Taiwanese society were characterised by a relatively cultural unity (Wade,
1991). This meant that this potential source of political instability was less
strong than it often was in other developing countries, and that this made it
easier to develop a solid nation state. Some authors also mention the fact that
the Japanese oppression of South Korea before 1945 drastically reduced the role
of lobbies in this country. With respect to Taiwan, the flight of political leaders
and their supporters from China had actually decimated the differences between
the various political lobbies. Finally, there was no elite based on the ownership
of natural resources, since these countries hardly had any natural resources. In
several Latin American countries this elite was an important opponent of the
government.
4.6 The contributions of the new interventionists: an evaluation
The new interventionists offer an alternative explanation for the economic
success of the East Asian countries during the past few decades. They point at
the existence of coordination problems and argue that these problems are the
main obstacle for economic development. For this reason the government
should play an active role. The analysis of the role of the government in East
Asia shows under which circumstances government intervention may have a
positive impact on the economic growth of a country. The contributions by the
new interventionists appear to resemble those by the development economists21
from the 1940s and 1950s. The difference, however, is that the new
interventionists have provided the understandings of the development
economists with a more solid theoretical and empirical basis.
Some questions remain unanswered, however. For example, the new
interventionist analysis of the role of the government in the East Asian success
has not convincingly shown why the efforts of the governments of these
countries seemed to have been explicitly concentrated on promoting long-term
economic development. This paper has described all conditions that must be
met in order for government intervention to contribute positively to economic
growth, as was the case in East Asia. However, why do governments in these
regions concentrate on maximising social rather than individual welfare?
Research into this specific aspect of government intervention and the
mechanisms involved appear to be of major importance in determining whether
the East Asian model could also be applied elsewhere.
Another starting point for future research refers to the empirical foundation
of the existence, nature and importance of coordination problems in a less
developed economy. Although the new interventionists have frequently and
convincingly described the existence of these failures, until now their empirical
proof has been scarcely provided. Therefore, micro-level research - i.e. at the
industrial level - into the significance of these coordination problems in
economic development is vital. Related to this, more empirical research ought
to be conducted into the importance of dynamic efficiency in a less developed
economy. This requires more analysis of the nature of the possible economies of
scale, the external effects in such economies, and the way in which they could
be exploited by government intervention.
5. Synthesis of Neoliberalism and New Interventionism?
The debate on the role of the government was quite explicit after the World
Bank had published a study in 1993 which contained an in-depth analysis of the
backgrounds of the East Asian success. The new interventionists criticised the22
World Bank for the contents of this report (see, among others, Amsden, 1994;
Kuchiki and Matsui, 1994; Kwon, 1994; Lall, 1994; and Yanagihara, 1994).
The analysis in this report builds on an earlier World Bank report (World Bank,
1991) in which the neoliberal view on the role of the government is somewhat
changed with respect to their previous attitude on this subject. Both the 1991
and 1993 reports assign a more positive role to government intervention. The
reports argue that interventions may add to economic growth, provided that
these interventions are market friendly. The market friendly nature of
interventions means that markets ought to function freely, unless the results are
clearly better in case of government intervention. Furthermore, checks and
balances have to be introduced: interventions must always be subject to the
discipline of the domestic and foreign markets as much as possible. Finally,
intervention must be straightforward and transparent, based on clear regulations,
so that the contents and consequences can be monitored by anyone (Singh,
1995, p. 5). The 1991 World Bank report introduces the market friendly
approach of government policy as the alternative road between market and
government.
Starting from this analysis framework, the 1993 report studies the economic
development of East Asia and endorse the positive role of the government in the
process of economic development of these countries. Furthermore, the report
argues that the distortions that were a result of government interventions were
small, especially as compared to those in other developing countries.
Government policies were often embedded in a competitive environment, all
according to the market friendly approach. At the same time, however, the
analysis shows that government intervention was by no means always
successful. The market is considered to remain the most efficient coordinating
mechanism. Therefore, the report’s advice is to get the prices right. The final
conclusion is that the most important positive contributions of government
intervention referred to creating a stable macroeconomic environment - in the
form of low inflation and government deficits, and a stable exchange rate - and
investment in the development of human capital. The government created the23
right environment within which private initiative could optimally contribute to
economic growth. Economic policies should concentrate on these factors, the
World Bank argues.
The recent World Bank report does only partly do justice to the new
interventionists criticism. The policy recommendations still seem to be rather
neoliberal. Although the World Bank report initially appears to lead to a
synthesis of the neoliberal model and the new interventionist understandings,
the policy implications of the analysis of the two camps differ very much. The
new interventionists point at the importance of government intervention and set
great store by industrial policies and the use of subsidies and other instruments
in order to realise a dynamically efficient allocation of resources, whereas the
World Bank continues to argue that the government ought to aim mainly at
creating macroeconomic stability and should aim solely at creating the right
conditions for private initiative.
To conclude, since the early 1990s there appears to be some general
agreement concerning the debate on the role of the government in the process of
economic development in East Asian countries. The World Bank - being the
main representative of the neoliberal point of view - and its critics agree on the
fact that the governments of these countries severely intervened in the economic
process. However, there is still great controversy about the effects on and
importance of intervention to economic development.
6.  Lessons to Other Developing Countries and Eastern
Europe?
The discussion described in this article on the economic success of the East
Asian countries and the role of the government is highly interesting since it may
also provide lessons to other developing countries and the former socialist
countries in Easter Europe. The response of the new interventionists to the
common neoliberal view concerning the role of the government versus the
market has resulted in more explicit attention to a number of important aspects24
of the process of economic growth.
First, the existence and importance of coordination problems in the
economy and the consequent obstacles to economic growth are stressed. This
aspect is generally neglected in the neoliberal theory. Second, a better
understanding has been gained concerning the issues of how a government can
successfully intervene in the processes of allocation and production if
coordination problems are significant and of how the government can contribute
to a dynamically more efficient distribution of resources.
Third, more knowledge has been obtained concerning the role certain
factors play in the process of economic development, such as human capital,
income distribution, the capability of the civil service, and the political-
economic relations between the government and lobbies in society. It has
become clear that in relation to this latter set of factors the East Asian countries
were different from most other developing countries and that the economic
success of the East Asian model as compared to economic growth in other
regions can be at least partly explained by means of these differences. Thus, it is
obvious that simply copying the economic model of such countries like South
Korea and Taiwan will be problematic if the above mentioned political
economic and institutional structures do not exist.
10 These above mentioned
characteristics of both countries were important preconditions for effective
government intervention.
All of these new insights have shed more light on the process of economic
development. These new insights may be of importance when policy
recommendations to other developing countries and to the former socialist
countries in Eastern Europe are designed. This, however, is not to say that other
models will not lead to successful economic growth. In Latin America, for
example, a more or less neoliberal policy has recently been rather successful in
                    
     
10 Lee (1995) and Singh (1995), however, seem to have more faith in copying at least some of
the characteristics of the East Asian model to other countries in order to stimulate their economic
development.25
Chile and Argentina.
Finally, further research into the questions the new interventionists have not
yet been able to answer satisfactorily - as were mentioned see section 4.6 -
seems essential before the usefulness of the East Asian models in other regions
can be really appreciated.26
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